United States of America v. Roy M. Belfast, Jr.

Court	United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, United States
Case number	No. 09–10461 (11th Cir. 2010), D.C. Docket No. 06-20758-CR-CMA
Decision title	Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Decision date	15 July 2010
Parties	Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant: Tract M. Dreispul, Miguel Caridad, Kathleen M. Williams, and Arturo Menendez, representing Mr. Roy M. Belfast, Jr. Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellee: Anne R. Schultz and John Alex Romano, representing the United States of America.
Other names	ROY M. BELFAST,Jr., “Charles McArthur Emmanuel”, “Charles Taylor,Jr.”, Chuckie Taylor, II (Emmanuel)
Categories	Conspiracy, Torture
Keywords	Conspiracy to torture, Convention Against Torture (CAT), Extraterritoriality, torture, Torture Act
Links	https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/09-10461/200910461-2011-02-28.pdf?ts=1411115369
Other countries involved	Liberia

Summary

Mr. Roy M. Belfast, Jr. (“Charles Taylor Jr.”), the first individual to be prosecuted under the Torture Act and the son of Former Liberian President and convicted war criminal Charles Taylor, was arrested and indicted in Florida, U.S., in December 2006 following a joint Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) / Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation.

In the indictment, Belfast was charged for his role in numerous acts of torture and other atrocities in Liberia between 1999 and 2003 while he was the commander of the States Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU). After hearing evidence from multiple witnesses describing the torture that the defendant had subjected them to, a jury convicted him on all counts and he was sentenced to 97 years in prison.

In 2010, he appealed that conviction before the United States Eleventh Circuit, arguing that Congress impermissibly expanded the prohibitions of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) through the Torture Act and that the Torture Act and U.S. firearms Statutes, under which he was convicted, could not apply to acts committed in Liberia before Liberia became a State Party to the CAT.

The Court rejected all of his arguments and upheld the conviction, finding that the U.S. Torture Act validly enacted CAT and he was convicted in line with the Constitution.

Procedural history

On 6 December 2006, Mr. Belfast was indicted on three counts related to numerous acts of torture committed in Liberia. Subsequently filed superseding indictments expanded on these counts, totaling eight counts detailing specific instances of torture, conspiracy to torture, and related firearm offences.

Mr. Belfast dismissed the indictment, claiming, among others, that the Torture Act, under which he was indicted, was unconstitutional because its definition did not mirror the definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) (p. 19). The District Court rejected Mr. Belfast's argument by explaining that the Torture Act ‘plainly bears a rational relationship’ (p. 20) and Congress had the power to legislate for the extraterritorial application of the Torture Act (p. 20).

He was eventually convicted by jury on all counts in 2009 and was sentenced to 97 years in prison (p. 23). This case is an appeal of his conviction.

Legally relevant facts

Mr. Belfast was born in Massachusetts in 1977 to Bernice Yolanda Emmanuel and Charles Taylor. Mr Belfast’s mother was married to Mr. Roy Belfast in 1983, after whom the defendant changed his name to Roy Belfast Jr. Mr. Belfast first visited his father in Liberia in 1992 when his father was the leader of a non-state armed group, the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), which was supporting one side of the civil war that erupted after the assassination of Liberian President Samuel Doe in 1990. The NPFL was fighting against the Kamajors, a militia in Sierra Leone, and regularly tortured Sierra Leonean civilians who had crossed the border to Liberia to escape the civil war, on the grounds that they intended to overthrow Charles Taylor’s regime (pp. 4 and 7).

Mr. Belfast visited his father again two years later, and at that time did not return to the United States. In 1997, his father was elected president of Liberia. Mr. Belfast was alleged to have created the State's Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) – also known as the ‘Demon Forces’ – which was responsible for the protection of Taylor’s family (p. 4). Between 1999-2002, Mr. Belfast, as the Chief of the ATU, wielded his power to terrify, abduct and torture local populations (p. 5).

Following his father’s eventual resignation and extradition to The Hague in 2003 – awaiting trial before the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) for crimes against humanity and war crimes – Mr. Belfast left Liberia (p. 18). In 2006, he was arrested at Miami International Airport for using falsified documents. After his arrest, he waived his rights and admitted his father’s identity, his role at the ATU and that he was present at the torture of a civilian (p. 18).

The United States ratified the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in 1994 and codified it in the Torture Act, pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of CAT, including a broader definition of torture (p. 26). According to the Torture Act, the United States has jurisdiction to prosecute anyone outside of the United States who commits or attempts to commit torture, if the alleged offender is a national of the United States or if the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or the alleged offender [18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a)].

Core legal questions

The core legal questions before the court were:

Does the United States Torture Act comply with the requirements of the CAT Convention? Does it exceed congressional authority because of its expanded definition of torture and its extension to armed conflict?
Is conspiracy to commit torture under the United States Torture Act a recognisable violation in accordance with the CAT and/or international law more generally, or does it exceed congressional authority?
Is the CAT’s Convention scope of application limited within the territorial borders of its signatories?
Does the Torture Act and its prohibition on conspiracy apply extraterritorially? Can 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), that criminalises the usage of a firearm in relation and during a crime, be applied extraterritorially?

Specific legal rules and provisions

The Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340–2340A
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

Court's holding and analysis

The Eleventh Circuit upheld and deemed constitutional all convictions. Firstly, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Torture Act is invalid because its definition of torture is broader than the one provided by the CAT (p. 28). The Court reasoned that Congress was well within its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution to implement the CAT through the Torture Act, and that the existence of slight variations between the treaty language and the enacting legislation did not invalidate the legislation, so long as a rational relationship between the CAT and the Torture Act existed (p. 29).

The Court also dismissed the defendant’s arguments related to extraterritoriality, the extension of the Torture Act to armed conflict, and the conspiracy charge. It reasoned that the CAT always prohibits torture, which inherently includes armed conflicts and regardless, the CAT does not prevent Congress from further prohibiting other wrongful acts (p. 41). Additionally, due to his status as a U.S. citizen by birth, Mr. Belfast is bound by the laws of the United States at all times, including the Torture Act, regardless of the ratification status of the CAT in Liberia (p. 42).

Further, the Court held that the CAT obliges a state party to it to assert jurisdiction over a person that has allegedly violated its provisions that is present in any territory under its jurisdiction. Similarly, Congress has the power to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of all citizens, and therefore the court has jurisdiction to prosecute Belfast’s transgressions abroad (p. 44).

The Court dismissed the defendant’s argument that the Torture Act exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority by criminalising conspiracy to commit torture as conspiracy is not criminalised in the CAT or in international law (p. 46). The analysis of the court focused on Article 4(1) of the CAT that requires state parties to criminalise torture, as well as complicity or participation, in their national legal systems. Thus, conspiracy amounts to such conduct (p. 47).

An additional argument of the defendant that was rejected by the Court was him using and carrying a firearm related to a crime of violence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), that does not apply extraterritorially (p. 50). The Court held that the Statute applies extraterritorially, and Congress can regulate conduct outside the territory of the United States. Thus, the Statute is applicable to any crime of violence that can be prosecuted before any United States court (p. 52).

Finally, the Court dismissed the defendant’s argument that the application of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause. Since the defendant raised this argument only in appeal, the Court was solely capable of examining it for plain error, meaning an error that was plain and affected his substantial rights (p. 55). The Court found no abuse of discretion or plain err in the evidence admitted by the trial court (p. 56).